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ABSTRACT
The overarching themes of our paper are to calibrate the risk premium relative to the speculative risk 
parameters in capital markets and to analyze the pre- and post- recession patterns in the U.S. lodg-
ing portfolios from 2000 to 2016. We decompose several risk parameters speculated by the markets 
and risk- adjusted proxies to make solid judgments about the anomalies in excess return patterns 
and risk- reward trade- off calibration in our annualized heterogeneous portfolio sorts. Our primary 
findings reveal that our portfolio sorts did not return the efficient premium to the investors, as they 
should have been based on the speculative risk levels before the recession. However, after the reces-
sion, there was a correction in this pattern. Lastly, speculative risk- adjusted proxies and risk parame-
ters generally co- move with the value- weighted benchmark.
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Introduction
Conventional performance efficiency measurement 
was long based on a comparison of the total return 
of a portfolio with those of an unmatched portfo-
lio, created by disregarding the universal portfolio 
of firms (benchmark/market portfolio). However, a 
simple comparison of the total return of the created 
portfolio with an unmatched portfolio may most 
likely produce invalid results and estimations for the 
speculative risk- reward assessment. Later on, due to 
asymmetric information and market inefficiencies, 
risk- reward estimations are improved with multi-
variate risk- adjusted performance efficiency proxies 
when calibrating the premium tied to the specula-
tive risk parameters. Investors become wiser and rely 
heavily on analysts’ recommendations made by these 
proxies to select among available investment funds 
and/or to form efficient portfolios. The applications 
and rules of thumbs of the risk- adjusted excess return 
estimations are not only common but are often the 
basis for real- life investment decisions. Rather than 
mechanical algorithm estimations, advocates strictly 
emphasize that restricting peers to the same indus-
try in the cross section, as opposed to clustering all 
firms in one portfolio, improves the accuracy in esti-
mations due to the existence of comparable assets and 
identical firms in a standardized manner (i.e., Kim 
& Ritter, 1999; Gibson, Hotchkiss, & Ruback, 2000; 
Yee, 2004). Also, Alford (1992) stated that errors in 
asset return analysis decline if a set of comparable 
firms are chosen from the same industry or, at least, 
subcategory of a certain industry. Therefore, a more 
nuanced understanding of how the premium is cal-
ibrated for the speculative risk parameters is criti-
cal as it draws a much more accurate risk- adjusted 
reward evaluation for firms and investors.
This phenomenon is even more critical for firms 
that have a unique history of volatile financial struc-
ture (i.e., high levels of capital expenditure, unsta-
ble earnings and free cash flow, and low liquidity 
and reduced possibilities for risk diversification) 
that adversely affects the risk premiums (Kizildag 
& Ozdemir, 2017). Our interest has been piqued by 
the aforementioned financial nature of the lodging 
firms. Thus, we believe that measuring speculative 
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risk- adjusted efficiency for those firms over time is 
worthwhile. In our paper, we quantify three risk- 
adjusted proxies, the Treynor Index, Sharpe ratio, 
and Jensen’s Alpha (α), along with the five proper-
ties of the speculative risk parameters calibrated to 
the systematic risk, total risk, and price volatility 
movement. We define our proxies and parameters 
consistently with the preceding analysis so that we 
can obtain uniform estimations across the sam-
pled firms in our lodging portfolios over the long 
haul. Additionally, as an economy enters a reces-
sion, it definitely causes severe blips on firms’ excess 
returns. Hence, we also aim to provide compelling 
empirical evidence of risk premium structure and 
economic significance on the pre- and post- effects 
of the recent 2007– 2009 recession. Consistent with 
the evidence and assessments above, we attempt to 
rationalize and demonstrate the current patterns of 
speculative risk- adjusted premium calibration for 
each of the annualized portfolio sorts to lay out per-
suasive and pervasive investing strategies within the 
context of the lodging industry. Our study departs 
from the existing literature because it exhibits the 
unique effects of speculative risk parameters on 
equity premiums, and thus, the risk- adjusted effi-
ciency for capital- intensive lodging portfolios over 
the long run. Within all the evidences, we contribute 
to and complement the existing evidence by provid-
ing an extensive economic outlook and across- the- 
board practical understanding in this manner.
Economic Foundations of Risk- Reward 
Properties
In general, the ultimate and inevitable connection 
and trade- off between risk and reward is fundamen-
tal to many theories (i.e., modern portfolio theory), 
concepts (i.e., efficient market hypothesis), and build-
ing blocks (i.e., the higher the risk, higher the return) 
of mainstream finance (Chou, Engle, & Kane, 1992). 
The general assertion is that “.  .  . historically, equi-
ties that produce the highest return simultaneously 
have the highest risk” (Brigham & Ehrhardt, 2017). 
Nevertheless, numerous studies, which have investi-
gated this matter, still put forth inconclusive empir-
ical evidence (Lee, Jiang, & Indro, 2002). This might 
be due to many reasons; however, advocates’ spe-
cific attitudes for a stringent validity of the estima-
tions are clear that the premium calibration against 
critical risk parameters is best understood when a 
single industry is analyzed (i.e., Asness, Frazini, & 
Pedersen, 2012). Therefore, several empirical doc-
umentations on risk- adjusted measurement for the 
excess returns especially tied to speculative markets 
have been lightening the needs for future examina-
tions, understandings, and explanations in different 
research areas with a narrow focus, stance, and angle.
In today’s research, some authors have looked at 
the lack of fully diversified portfolios as a source for 
excess returns, as real- life investors often hold under- 
diversified portfolios in which idiosyncratic risk can-
not completely be eliminated (Goetzmann & Kumar, 
2008; Levy, 1978). A study by Merton (1987), for 
example, showed that there could be larger expected 
returns than in fully diversified portfolios. Other 
researchers considered investors’ sentiments as a 
primary driver of the premium. Lee et al. (2002), for 
instance, found that investors’ sentiments were pos-
itively correlated with excess returns, as sentiments 
are considered systematic risks that are being priced 
by the speculative markets. Excess return measure-
ment with various risk parameters is pervasive and 
coherent because it entails calculating unique effects 
of risk on the premium in a related benchmark. Per-
formance measurement that is unadjusted for risk is 
not quite meaningful, and that is why there has been a 
pursuit for indicators that measure risk- adjusted per-
formance based on various risk components (Asness 
et al., 2012). The Sharpe ratio is the most commonly 
used proxy for adjusting total upside and down-
side risk (standard deviation σ) for both for the risk 
premia (Muralidhar, 2002). Jensen’s Alpha had the 
highest explanatory power in demonstrating the risk- 
adjusted performance and return in relation to the 
benchmark returns (Bodson, Cave, & Sougne, 2012). 
Scholz and Wilkens (2005) reported that systematic 
risk components (both levered and unlevered) may 
offer a better assessment of “risk- fit analysis,” particu-
larly if the firms’ capital expenditures are levered and 
risky (i.e., lodging firms). So, it is inevitable to exam-
ine systematic risk for the portfolio excess return 
optimization with various risk- adjusted proxies, such 
as the Treynor Index. Moreover, the price volatility 
movement measured by the structural differences 
between annualized high and low closing prices in 
a given year (hi/lo risk) has received some atten-
tion by the researchers as well (i.e., Fornell, Mithas, 
Morgeson, & Kirshan, 2006).
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Although most research in the hospitality indus-
try does not present an extensive and comprehensive 
line of understanding equity premium calibration 
with the existence of the speculative risk, the cur-
rent line of research has touched base with some of 
the risk parameters while analyzing returns. Some 
studies showed that lodging firms outperform other 
subsectors of real estate (office retail, industrial, and 
apartment) regarding the total return and they also 
produced second-best risk- adjusted returns for the 
period of 1992 to 2001 (Petersen, Singh, & Sheel 2003). 
Accordingly, risk- adjusted performance evalua-
tion with the Sharpe ratio for the U.S. airline, hotel, 
restaurant, and travel and leisure industries showed 
underperformance of the equity portfolios resulting 
in a poor investment consideration (Ming- Hsiang, 
2012). Further, four risk- adjusted performance prox-
ies (Treynor Index, Sharpe ratio, Jensen’s Alpha, 
and Appraisal ratio) were employed by Mao & Gu 
(2007) to measure the premium efficiency of hotel/
motel, restaurant, and casino/gaming industries. 
Their results indicated that the gaming/casino indus-
try portfolio outperformed the hotel/motel industry 
portfolio. Taken all together, a solid comprehensive 
analysis, which relies on mechanical analysis with 
comparable assets/firms in identical years for the long 
run, is still needed, although there is some evidence 
in the existing literature.
Data and Sampling Methods
Longitudinal equity data for each comparable firm 
in each lodging portfolio sort was gathered from 
Damadoran Online Data Source, which is compiled 
from Morningstar, Bloomberg, and Capital IQ fil-
ings.1 Monthly financial and market data (i.e., risk- 
free rate) for 16  years were gathered from CRSP/
COMPUSTAT files. The most straightforward analy-
sis involves the risk- reward efficiency measurement 
in equities in portfolio sorts against a broader mar-
ket index that measures the value weighted average 
price movements (i.e., Elton, Gruber, & Blake, 1996). 
Thus, we picked Standard and Poor’s 500 Composite 
Index (S&P 500 Composite) as a market benchmark 
for our measurement and analyses. Our estimations 
have been annualized so that we can produce eco-
nomically significant outcomes for the risk- adjusted 
1 Dr. Aswath Damadoran’s archived data is available at: http:// people .stern .nyu .edu/ adamodar/.
performance measures. Given the structure of the 
archived data for the lodging industry, we split our 
final sample into 16 portfolios for each year from 
2000 to 2016. In order to construct both specula-
tive risk parameters and risk- adjusted proxies for 
excess return, financial and market data lagged by 
a fiscal year for 2000. Since absolute closing prices 
of stocks are adjusted for tax and dividends and 
they have skewed distributions, those prices can-
not be utilized for both estimation and comparison 
purposes. To overcome this issue in our examina-
tions, we quantified standardized values rather than 
market values of the stocks. We eliminated all of the 
observations that did not have a record of at least 
five- year speculative risk metrics and equity prices 
(both high and low bid and ask prices). Also, we 
did not include other hospitality subsectors, such 
as gaming or cruise lines, due to lack of data and 
large gaps of missing data in firm records. There-
fore, our final sample has a minor selection bias that 
could be attributed to this selection factor. Further, 
we have kept the outliers, which do not lie only on 
one side of the distribution, so that our results can 
be free of estimation bias. Lastly, comparable firms 
in the portfolio sorts must have been listed in COM-
PUSTAT for at least two years prior to the particu-
lar estimation year to mitigate the backfilling and 
survivorship biases (Fama & French, 1993). Taken 
all together, this estimation process helped us accu-
rately differentiate how big the equity premium is 
for the speculative risk proxies and assess losing or 
winning annual portfolios in our final sample.
Decomposition of the Speculative Risk 
Parameters
In the current disposition and dynamics of capital 
markets, advocates’ recommendations and asser-
tions (i.e., Asness, Hood, & Huss, 2015) are not 
heavily dependent upon quantifying excess return 
metrics and analyzing its distributions without risk- 
adjusted parameters when measuring risk- reward 
efficiency. Convex and speculative risk parameters, 
such as volatility in price movement between high 
and low closing prices (hi/lo risk), communicate 
with the investors better and more efficiently in the 
essence of their risk- adjusted risk- reward yields. This 
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is mainly because the premium for any equity is an 
increasing and/or decreasing function of specula-
tion in risky assets, and hence, an increasing and/or 
decreasing function of both idiosyncratic and non- 
idiosyncratic risk values. Further, nearly all of the 
variation in premium assessment and equity perfor-
mance is explained and dominated by the variation 
in stocks’ risk exposures in equity markets (Asness 
et  al., 2012; Garleanu & Pedersen, 2011). Risk- 
adjusted excess return decomposition is also critical 
for diverse investment opportunities as it provides 
a clear foundation of portfolio value creation with 
various parameters and proxies that signal the true 
market price of a share vis- à- vis its risk components. 
To address our analysis with an economic accuracy 
and an empirical relevancy, we documented various 
proxies for the excess return based on speculative 
risk parameters assessing the degrees of the investors’ 
exposure to risk- reward structure and the premium 
calibrated for these speculative  risk parameters in 
lodging portfolio sorts over the long haul. The risk- 
reward proxies and metrics we employed in our 
analyses are defined in detail below.
Levered Beta (β_levered)
Levered beta is directly associated with the proba-
bility distribution of returns of a firm’s stock, such 
as the second and third moments of the distribution 
and the coefficient of correlation between the returns 
from a single stock and/or all other available stocks in 
the capital markets (Arditti, 1967). Beta coefficient (β) 
better absorbs the roles of excess returns by providing 
the quantifiable effect of systematic risk when com-
bined with size (high minus low– HML) and book- to- 
market equity (small minus big– SMB) factors (Fama 
& French, 2002). Additionally, lodging firms’ capital 
structure is highly sensitive to systematic risks due to 
high volatility in cash flows yielding higher leverage 
amounts (Kizildag, 2015; Kizildag & Ozdemir, 2017; 
Andrew & Schmidgall, 1993). Therefore, we utilized 
Fama and French’s three- factor model with a 36- 
month rolling window to extract β_levered as follows:
 Rit − Rf =  
 βit(Rmt − Rf) + siSMBt + hiHMLt + εit (1)
where Rit − Rf is the premium for the return and βit is 
the estimated levered beta for stock i at time t. Rmt − Rf 
is the excess return on a market portfolio. SMB and 
HML are the size and book- to- market- equity factors, 
respectively. εit is the error term. The 30- day T-bill 
rate was taken as a proxy for the risk- free rate (Rf).
Unlevered Beta (β_unlevered)
This risk proxy is unlevered by the market value 
debt to equity ratio for the sector. Unlevering a beta 
removes the financial effects from both operational 
and financial leverage (debt). That is, it is the beta 
coefficient of each firm without any debt when ana-
lyzing the equity performance in relation to the 
overall market (Kiselakova, Horvathova, Sofran-
kova, & Soltes, 2015; Damadoran, n.d.). Hence, the 
β_unlevered is quantified as indicated below:
 β_unleveredit = β_leveredit /  
 [(1 + (1 - T)*(Debt/Equity Ratioit)] (2)
where T is the corporate tax rate. Debt defined as 
including short- term and long- term debt, excluding 
accounts payable and/or non- interest bearing liabil-
ities, and the book value of debt is used as a proxy for 
market value of debt for β_unlevered estimations.
Unlevered Beta Corrected for Cash (β_unlevered’)
As corrected for cash holdings, this unlevered beta 
measure reflects both each firm’s operating assets 
and cash holdings. Since the latter should have a 
beta close to zero, we estimated this beta coefficient 
of just the operating assets by using two numbers: 
the unlevered beta and the cash as a percent of over-
all firm value in market terms in our portfolio sorts 
(Damadoran, n.d.).
 β_unleveredʹit = [β_unleveredit /  
 (1 - Cashit / Firm Valueit)] (3)
where Cashit is the total value of cash and marketable 
securities reported in a firm’s balance sheet. Firm Val-
ueit is equal to Market Value of Equityit + Book Value of 
Interest- bearing Debtit + PV of Lease Commitmentsit.
Hi/Lo Risk Coefficient (Annualized)
This is a risk parameter of price volatility adjusted 
for the year based on daily price ranges. Hi/lo 
  THE JOURNAL OF HOSPITALITY FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT 67
captures the maximum difference between any 
equity transaction prices that were realized in a 
given daily trading day. Hi/lo risk proxy is not only 
very efficient and stringent but also robust to micro-
structure noise (deviation from stock’s fundamen-
tal value such as bid- ask bounce, the discreteness of 
price change, etc.) when analyzing price adjusted for 
risk. The coefficient will be zero, if the equity price 
is constant (Sassan, Brandt, & Diebold, 2002; Dama-
doran, n.d.). Therefore, consistent with these prior 
studies, hi/lo is simply computed as:
 Hi/Lo =  
 [(52wk High Price – 52wk Low Price)*2] /  
 (52wk High Price + 52wk Low Price) (4)
where wk is the week.
Standard Deviation of Equity (σ_equity)
Besides levered and unlevered idiosyncratic risk 
components of equities, we also investigated total 
risk undertaken by all the stocks in our yearly 
portfolio sorts to scrutinize both the volatility sen-
sitivity of our portfolio sorts’ performance in rela-
tion to the market as a whole and the total risk 
inherent to individual equity prices in each port-
folio sort. This allowed us to observe and deliver a 
sustainable analysis and a clear framework of the 
premium sensitivity for the aggregate (total) specu-
lative risk exposures, as Sullivan, Hutchingson, and 
O’Connell (2009) and Fornell, Morgeson, and Hult 
(2016) reported this conclusion in their papers as 
well. Also, Petersen (2009) stated that analysts and 
advocates frequently base their premium judg-
ments on a combination of idiosyncratic and non- 
idiosyncratic risk constructs. σ_equity is derived as 
follows:
  (5)
where Standard Deviation of Equity is the squared 
root of each equity’s ( j) total squared distance from 
the mean (Σj=1n (rj – r¯)2) multiplied by the probability 
of occurrence of the jth equity in each portfolio sorts 
a given year (n).
Measurement of the Equity Premium
Most of the empirical approaches compute premium 
metrics based on longitudinal historic data and are 
mostly justified on the basis of predicted relation-
ships with accounting items on the books (i.e., con-
ventional indicators such as return on assets – ROA, 
Tobin’s Q, etc.). Those accounting- based proxies 
ignore the ex- post excess return that firms receive 
for exposing themselves to the extra volatility and 
risk that are speculated and emerge by holding risky 
assets in risky markets (i.e., Katchova & Enlow, 
2013; Sorensen & Jagannathan, 2015). However, 
when compared to the conventional proxies, risk- 
calibrated measurements make adjustments to the 
excess returns in order to take account of the differ-
ences in various speculative risk levels between the 
portfolio returns and the benchmark returns. Spe-
cifically, the risk- adjusted and market- based proxies 
diversify the risk estimations across the versatility 
of portfolio and index return distributions with an 
absolute decomposition and performance of excess 
returns (Modigliani & Modigliani, 1997). As a result 
of these, we picked the most notable risk- adjusted 
and market- based proxies to measure the premium 
levels calibrated by the fluctuating degrees of specu-
lative risk parameters.
Treynor Index
The Treynor Index is critical and effective when 
measuring the excess return in relation to mar-
ket risk factor without leveraging the return of the 
equity as Jensen’s Alpha estimation does. Thus, it is 
empirically worthwhile and necessary to assess the 
index coefficients in combination with the estima-
tions of the two other risk- adjusted proxies (Sharpe 
ratio and Jensen’s Alpha) to infer solid economic 
significance of the outcomes (Treynor, 1965; Eling & 
Schuhmacher, 2007). This index computes the risk 
premium as in the Sharpe ratio. However, the major 
difference between the Treynor Index and the Sharpe 
ratio is that the premium in this index is computed 
per unit of systematic risk (β) instead of the total 
upside and downside risk (σ) of the portfolio as the 
estimation considers a non- diversifiable portion of 
the total risk, which cannot be eliminated through 
diversification. We quantified the Treynor Index as 
follows:
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  (6)
Reduced to,
  
 
  (7)
Derived as,
  (8)
where Treynor Indexit is the co- product П of firms’ 
annualized stock returns rit with geometric means 
GMit, number of periods per year p, and number of 
years n minus the co- product П of 30- day T-bill (rf), 
number of periods per year p, and number of years n 
over in parenthesis, covariance of market and firms’ 
annualized stock returns ρi,m σm over standard devi-
ation of annualized benchmark returns σm, which 
estimates the beta (βit).
Sharpe Ratio
Pioneered by Sharpe (1966), the Sharpe ratio relies 
on the first two moments of the asymmetric return 
distributions as the expected value and the standard 
deviation (σ). This ratio takes into account the cor-
relation between the benchmark and the respec-
tive equity (Sharma, 2004; Brooks & Kat, 2002). 
The Sharpe ratio computes the risk premium of the 
selected portfolio per unit of total risk of that port-
folio by capturing the reward (premium) for invest-
ing in a risky portfolio in excess of the risk- free rate 
of interest and variability of returns of the selected 
portfolio. Based on the properties of the Sharpe 
ratio, we derived this proxy as follows:
  
  (9)
Simplifying equation (9) into,
  
  (10)
Thus,
  
  (11)
where Sharpe Ratioit is the co- product П of firms’ 
annualized stock returns rit with geometric means 
GMit, number of periods per year p, and number of 
years n minus the co- product П of 30- day T-bill (rf), 
number of periods per year p, and number of years n 
over under square root variance varit of firms’ annu-
alized stock returns rit with geometric means GMit 
and annualized benchmark return rm, which esti-
mates the standard deviation (σit).
Jensen’s Alpha (Jensen’s α)
Jensen’s Alpha, the intercept in a regression, is 
another proxy in providing the absolute excess 
return obtained when deviating from the bench-
mark. Along with the other two metrics assessing the 
premium, Jensen’s Alpha represents the part of the 
mean return of the equity that cannot be explained 
by the systematic risk exposure (i.e., β_levered) to 
benchmark variations. Thus, α is given by the annu-
alized return of the equity, deducted the yield of an 
investment without risk, and minus the return of 
the benchmark multiplied by the stock’s β given a 
particular year (Jensen, 1968). The linear formula to 
extract α coefficient is as follows:
  (12)
where Jensen’s Alphait ( ) is the annualized geo-
metric return of firms’ annualized stock returns rit 
minus 30- day T-bill (rf), plus firms’ annualized beta 
βit multiplied by the market risk premium (rm – rf).
Empirical Results and Findings
There were not extensive fluctuations in the mean 
and median values for both speculative risk parame-
ters and the risk- adjusted equity premium measures. 
Thus, the pattern in descriptive values demonstrated 
that the premium estimations based on risk deriva-
tions are highly aligned with each other. For instance, 
hi/lo risk proxy had the lowest mean and median 
value (x¯ = 0.45 and x˜ = 0.42), whereas σ_equity fluc-
tuated within the upper bound of 62.02% and the 
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lower bound of 25.71% with the highest mean and 
median values (x¯ = 43.39% and x˜ = 46.07%) in our 
final sample of 56 lodging firms with 1,259 firm 
observations. Additionally, risk- adjusted premium 
measures signaled consistencies with the underlying 
risk parameters since the same pattern of descrip-
tive values holds validity for these proxies as well. 
For example, upper and lower bound distribution 
of Sharpe ratio was between 1.121 and – 0.922 with 
x¯ = 0.525 and x˜ = 0.842 in the aggregate portfo-
lio sorts. Table  1 provides the characteristics and 
descriptive values of the portfolio sorts along with 
the sample size for each year in detail.
To draw more meaningful estimations in our multi- 
proxy analyses and derivation, we report annualized 
risk parameter estimates along with the risk- adjusted 
premium measures for both our equity lodging port-
folios and the value weighted aggregate benchmark, 
S&P 500 Composite from 2000 to 2016 in Table  2. 
One striking result in this paper is that the annualized 
premiums are not as efficient as they should have been 
when lodging portfolios are adjusted to both levered 
and unlevered per unit of systematic risk between 
2000 and 2004. We observed the same patterns when 
we analyzed the annualized, mean excess returns 
earned by lodging portfolios in excess of the risk- free 
rate per unit of total risk. Parallel to this, equity pre-
mium performance was not superior when deviating 
from the benchmark returns in this period. Portfolios’ 
Treynor Index, Sharpe ratio, and Jensen’s Alpha were 
low in 2002 (0.342, 0.003, and 0.023 respectively) but 
they bore higher degrees of non- diversifiable risk 
(β_levered: 0.90 and β_unlevered: 0.56), even when 
they were corrected for cash (β_unleveredʹ: 0.58). 
However, the movement in price volatility (hi/lo: 0.22) 
and the total risk distribution both upside as well as 
downside was narrower (σ_equity: 25.71%). Lodging 
portfolios only performed well, provided higher risk- 
adjusted proxies, and had better premiums overall 
in 2004 in this period (Treynor Index: 0.842, Sharpe 
ratio: 0.059, and Jensen’s α: 0.031). One explanation 
might be that equities were possibly exposed to low 
or inconsistent growth in earnings (i.e., diluted per 
share earnings). Also, equity prices are possibly sub-
ject to market speculations causing undervaluation, 
and thus, poor risk- adjusted excess returns for the 
investors although they co- move with the aggregate 
market (Treynor Indexm: 0.581, Sharpe ratiom: 0.022, 
and Jensen’s αm: 0.061).
Annualized estimations from 2005 to 2007 gave 
us enough clues about the meltdown in prices as 
well as drastically minimal excess returns. There-
fore, before drawing conclusions about the after-
math of the recession, we also checked how big the 
risk and premium differences were in our lodging 
portfolio sorts before and after the recent economic 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics
This table reports the annualized summary of fundamental descriptive values for both speculative risk parameters and risk- 
adjusted excess return measures along with the associated total number of lodging firms for the aggregate portfolio sorts 
from 2000 to 2016. Annualized aggregate market (S&P 500 Composite) descriptive values are not included.
Min. Max. Mean Obs.
Speculative Risk Proxies
Levered Beta
(β_levered)
0.74 1.75 1.18
(0.97)
N=1,259
n=56
Unlevered Beta (β_unlevered) 0.50 1.24 0.78
(0.66)
N=1,259
n=56
Unlevered Beta Corrected for Cash
(β_unlevered’)
0.52 1.35 0.82
(0.69)
N=1,259
n=56
Hi/Lo Risk Coefficient
(Annualized)
0.22 0.75 0.45
(0.42)
N=1,259
n=56
Standard Deviation of Equity (σ_equity) 25.71% 62.02% 43.39%
(46.07%)
N=1,259
n=56
Risk- Adjusted Premium Measures
Treynor Index − 0.019 1.121 0.038
(0.059)
N=1,259
n=56
Sharpe Ratio 0.001 0.135 0.525
(0.842)
N=1,259
n=56
Jensen’s Alpha (α) − 0.083 0.075 0.020
(0.033)
N=1,259
n=56
Note: Numbers in parentheses are the median figures for the corresponding proxies and measures.
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crisis, lasting roughly 2.5  years in the 2007– 2009 
period. Figures 1 and 2 report the results and pat-
terns in detail. Our chief understanding was that 
when  the global economy started to slow down 
during the  years preceding the recession, the net 
effect of  the crisis was severe on lodging firms 
because their vulnerability to the risk speculated in 
markets worsened their financial gains. That is, the 
premium was not equally calibrated for the specula-
tive risk generated in the benchmarks. Although the 
speculative risk parameters scored high (β_levered: 
0.88, β_unlevered: 0.61, β_unleveredʹ: 0.63, hi/
lo risk: 0.44, and σ_equity: 45.00% in the 7- year 
pre- crisis moving average), lodging portfolios did 
not achieve higher premiums per unit of risk they 
bear,  (Treynor Index: − 0.04, Sharpe ratio: 0.002, 
and Jensen’s α: − 0.01 in the 7- year pre- crisis moving 
average). This pattern was an indicator of a drastic 
volatility and tumble in equity prices along with 
the great level of uncertainty, and hence, the inev-
itable recession. In the heat of the downturn at the 
beginning of 2008, lodging portfolio sorts’ excess 
returns drastically degraded to the lowest levels. For 
instance, the Treynor Index was around − 0.80 score 
range, indicating that lodging firms’ net earnings 
and liquidity conditions from the excess returns 
were not strong enough to offset their residual risk 
levels. During the post- upheaval period, credit crea-
tion of aggregate long- term loans and eased lend-
ing procedures enabled lodging firms to relax their 
borrowing capacity rapidly and grow their lever-
age ratios aggressively (Altin, Kizildag, & Ozdemir, 
2016; Kizildag & Ozdemir, 2017). Thus, the bounce 
back from a recent crisis gave those firms solid 
opportunities to reap higher rewards with associated 
higher risk levels. This pattern has been long drawn 
out until the current day. Financial and economic 
relief in the macro- and micro- environment econ-
omy as well as the recovery in firms’ earnings, cash 
flows, leverage, and liquidity in the markets were the 
main reasons why portfolio sorts’ premium levels 
skyrocketed. The post- crisis 7- year moving averages 
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Figure 1. Speculative Risk Comparison Plot between Pre- and Post-2008 Economic Crisis
The pre-2008 period corresponds to fiscal years between 2001 and 2008. Post-2008 era includes fiscal years of 2009 to 2016 
for an equal 7-year comparison. Vertical dashed lines demonstrate where the equity prices started to free fall.
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for Treynor Index, Sharpe ratio, and Jensen’s α were 
1.08, 0.10, and 0.05, respectively, yielding high pre-
miums for the investors. As it can clearly be inferred 
from the first figure, the positive sentiment and con-
fidence (both individual and institutional) on Wall 
Street raised risk levels parallel to the excess return 
generated in capital markets in the aftermath of the 
upheaval. β_levered was 1.50 and hi/lo risk parame-
ter was 0.47 when post- crisis 7- year moving averages 
were analyzed. Investment fear dip enabled lodging 
firms to capitalize on capital investments and +Net 
Present Value (+NPV) projects. Bottom line, lodg-
ing firms entered an unprecedented “excess return 
era” after 2008.
In the aftermath of the recession, investors’ bull-
ish sentiment bumped share prices, and thus, over-
all firm values in benchmarks yielded high excess 
returns. Based on the Treynor Index estimation, 
1.119 units of excess return were generated per unit 
of levered and unlevered systematic risk. This sce-
nario was the same for the Sharpe ratio and Jensen’s 
α as well. These measures scored the highest levels at 
0.135 and 0.075, respectively, in 2010 along with the 
high levels of speculative risk parameters, which are 
very natural to observe (β_levered: 1.74, β_unlevered: 
1.00, β_unleveredʹ: 1.06, hi/lo risk: 0.42, and σ_equity: 
46.07%). This means that for every point of return, 
investors are shouldering 0.135 units of total upside and 
downside risk given the expected return in the bench-
mark. Our estimations signal and imply that investors 
not only gain competitive positioning in “good” invest-
ments and excess returns but also earn higher solid 
income generated from the relaxed market conditions 
and macro- and micro- investment practices. Our find-
ings and results also tell us that there is a fair trade- 
off between speculative risk parameter values and the 
risk- adjusted premium measures, which demonstrates 
that obtained estimations are reasonable given the 
estimation patterns. For the short- term predictions, 
these results support expected momentum investing, 
forward- looking investment potential, and sustainable 
financial productivity in the lodging industry.
Concluding Remarks, Implications, and Future 
Directions
The standard and very practical advice provided by 
the advocates and analysts is that risk identification 
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Figure 2. Risk-Adjusted Proxy Comparison Plot between Pre- and Post-2008 Economic Crisis
The pre-2008 period corresponds to fiscal years between 2001 and 2008. Post-2008 era includes fiscal years of 2009 to 2016 
for an equal 7-year comparison. Vertical dashed lines demonstrate where the equity prices started to free fall.
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in every type of financial investment is not a one- 
faced phenomenon. It is the dynamic practice that 
is assessed and re- assessed periodically and con-
tinuously according to the investment objective(s) 
because no economic and/or financial factors can 
fully predict the likelihood of financial occurrence 
and outcome in asymmetric markets (i.e., Barreda 
& Kizildag, 2015). Tangled findings in previous 
research have not shown a solid consensus about 
how the premium is calibrated for the various 
speculative risk parameters over time (i.e., Eling & 
Schuhmacher, 2007). Therefore, our paper aimed to 
develop an extensive understanding of how a variety 
of risk factors relative to market speculation shape the 
Table 2. Annualized Estimations for the Excess Return and Speculative Risk Exposure
This table reports the annualized estimations of the speculative risk parameters and the risk- adjusted performance proxies 
quantified for assessing the risk premium. Estimations are presented as an integer for both Equity Portfolio Sorts and the 
Aggregate Market Value Weighted Benchmark (S&P 500) in Parts A and Part B respectively.
Part A: Annualized Estimations of the Equity Portfolio Sorts
Speculative Risk Parameters Risk Premium Proxies
Years β_levered β_unlevered β_unlevered’ Hi/Lo Risk σ_equity
Treynor  
Index
Sharpe  
Ratio Jensen’s α
2000 0.93 0.66 0.69 0.33 30.12% 0.566 0.026 0.057
2001 0.84 0.53 0.55 0.36 47.82% 0.438 0.012 0.038
2002 0.90 0.56 0.58 0.22 25.71% 0.342 0.033 0.023
2003 0.91 0.50 0.52 0.39 36.15% 0.416 0.034 − 0.019
2004 0.84 0.54 0.56 0.34 51.60% 0.842 0.059 0.031
2005 0.74 0.54 0.56 0.40 34.55% −0.019 0.002 − 0.028
2006 0.82 0.63 0.66 0.36 46.75% − 0.634 0.001 − 0.046
2007 0.77 0.60 0.62 0.75 62.02% − 0.767 0.005 − 0.083
2008 1.25 0.96 0.98 0.70 55.06% − 0.922 0.007 − 0.021
2009 1.70 0.78 0.84 0.55 37.84% 1.037 0.092 0.059
2010 1.74 1.00 1.06 0.42 46.07% 1.119 0.135 0.075
2011 1.75 1.24 1.35 0.40 41.58% 1.061 0.088 0.049
2012 1.74 1.20 1.28 0.50 47.82% 1.121 0.107 0.066
2013 1.65 1.21 1.29 0.56 41.71% 1.088 0.083 0.046
2014 1.27 0.87 0.90 0.44 36.49% 1.113 0.091 0.033
2015 1.18 0.80 0.83 0.45 49.55% 1.078 0.079 0.029
2016 0.97 0.65 0.68 0.42 46.75% 1.054 0.085 0.037
Part B: Annualized Estimations of the Aggregate Market Value Weighted Benchmark (S&P500)
Speculative Risk Parameters Risk Premium Proxies
Years β_leveredm β_unleveredm β_unlevered’m Hi/Lo Riskm σ_equitym
Treynor 
Indexm
Sharpe  
Ratiom Jensen’s αm
2000 0.86 0.70 0.75 0.35 38.16% 0.581 0.022 0.061
2001 0.87 0.72 0.73 0.36 34.55% 0.445 0.018 0.030
2002 0.89 0.73 0.78 0.28 36.17% 0.362 0.041 0.017
2003 0.99 0.72 0.81 0.41 40.88% 0.403 0.029 − 0.022
2004 0.91 0.68 0.72 0.42 41.58% 0.881 0.061 0.028
2005 1.00 0.81 0.87 0.46 46.75% − 0.032 0.004 −0.037
2006 1.15 0.89 0.97 0.69 47.82% − 0.826 0.002 − 0.041
2007 1.14 0.90 0.89 0.60 68.90% − 0.912 0.004 − 0.080
2008 1.26 0.98 1.05 0.49 59.06% − 1.003 0.006 − 0.019
2009 1.19 0.77 0.86 0.38 57.84% 1.001 0.090 0.055
2010 1.17 0.82 0.90 0.45 51.60% 1.009 0.186 0.073
2011 1.15 0.80 0.93 0.44 46.75% 1.198 0.091 0.051
2012 1.13 0.83 0.82 0.31 49.87% 1.213 0.111 0.055
2013 1.17 0.87 0.96 0.43 50.66% 1.076 0.085 0.039
2014 1.01 0.60 0.64 0.47 52.34% 1.088 0.088 0.031
2015 1.06 0.67 0.70 0.46 53.60% 1.092 0.074 0.027
2016 0.13 0.61 0.77 0.44 51.65% 1.061 0.081 0.034
Note: Risk parameters and the risk premium proxies are in monthly values that are adjusted to annual values. To annualize any monthly 
estimation in our data analyses, we employed an economic derivation as:  where Xm and Xm- 1 are the values of the 
parameters in months m and m- 1, respectively, and gm is the annualized percent change. Estimations for the aggregate benchmark are 
signified by m in Part B.
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changing behavior of excess return effectiveness and 
performance in our portfolio sorts at various time 
frames for investors in the capital- intensive lodging 
industry. During the years preceding the 2007– 2009 
recession, lodging portfolio sorts interestingly did not 
provide higher levels of excess returns in exchange 
for the relative speculative risks (i.e., levered market 
risk) although lodging firms bear high levels of risk 
(i.e., total upside and downside risk) and high levels 
of price volatility. We interpreted this stagnancy in 
equity trades, stock prices, and investments as inves-
tors’ potential recessional sentiment. Shortly after, 
our portfolio sorts experienced a great level of nega-
tive price disturbances and a downturn in macro- and 
micro- structure, and hence, the economic recession 
that negative risk- adjusted returns caused a very dry 
environment on Wall Street in terms of liquidity in 
equity exchange, trade, and investments. When the 
economy was in a “boom” state, investors’ confidence 
had re- achieved enabling lodging firms to recover 
from losses in markets and to have high productivity 
and output growth. The re- established positivity and 
information efficiency also enabled investors to “cor-
rectly” price the value of liquid assets in benchmarks. 
As a result of these, asset supply in markets and inves-
tors’ demand created a new equilibrium in equity 
prices that risk- reward trade- off was balanced with 
the highest excess returns and maintained this bullish 
pattern until the present time.
Our results and findings are closely relevant to 
industry professionals and practitioners, such as the 
management of the lodging firms, fund or money 
managers supplying funds to these firms for invest-
ment purposes, and lodging industry consultants, 
who utilize speculative risk- adjusted proxies to mea-
sure the excess returns, as well as to related academic 
researchers. The choice of risk- adjusted proxies does 
not have a crucial influence on the relative evalua-
tion of how big the premium is for the speculative 
risk exposure in lodging portfolio sorts. In other 
words, the selection process for portfolio forma-
tion and diversification varies. Practitioners’ and/or 
investors’ points of view and investment objectives 
and risk- aversion levels become essential in such 
cases. For instance, any particular portfolio forma-
tion might give more weight to systematic risk or 
total risk adjusted estimations for the excess return 
assessment. Therefore, considering investors’ diverse 
utility maximization strategies and levels, it is best for 
practitioners to identify comparable assets with iden-
tical firms for any selected target firms or portfolios or 
peer industry standards with various risk and reward 
parameters and measures. Our analyses, results, and 
findings provide informed knowledge about different 
speculative risk- adjusted excess return calibration and 
patterns as well as shed a light on various decision- 
making strategies and momentum in investing and 
portfolio formation within the lodging industry.
The use of the results and findings of our paper is 
generalizable to a comprehensive population of U.S. 
lodging firms; however, as in any other study, our 
paper is not free of limitations and has some minor 
exclusions. Our estimations for the calibration of the 
equity premium against speculative risk exposure 
can be extended by including additional parameters 
and proxies such as the sortino ratio, upside poten-
tial ratio, excess return on value at risk, etc. More-
over, a worthwhile extension might pay attention to 
factor- analytic techniques, such as path analysis or 
causal models that mitigate presumptive measure-
ment issues encountered when working with factors 
affecting speculative risk parameters and premium 
measurement such as financial leverage (i.e., total 
debt- to- equity ratio). Additionally, analyses con-
centrating upon the likelihood of financial distress 
and bankruptcy/default- risk along with the lodg-
ing portfolio aggregate risk levels can also move the 
related research forward.
References
Alford, W. A. (1992). The effect of the set of comparable firms 
on the accuracy of the price- earnings valuation method. 
Journal of Accounting Research, 30(1), 94– 108.
Altin, M., Kizildag, M., & Ozdemir, O. (2016). Corporate 
governance, ownership structure, and credit ratings 
of hospitality firms. Journal of Hospitality Financial 
Management 24(1), 5– 19.
Andrew, W. P., & Schmidgall, R. S. (1993). Financial 
management for the hospitality industry. East Lansing, 
Michigan: Educational Institute of the American Hotel and 
Motel Association.
Arditti, D. F. (1967). Risk and the required return on equity. 
Journal of Finance, 22(1), 19– 36.
Asness, S. C., Frazzini, A., & Pedersen, H. L. (2012). Leverage 
aversion and risk parity. Financial Analysts Journal, 68(1), 
47– 59.
Asness, S. C., Hood, T. B., & Huss, J. J. (2015). Determinants 
of levered portfolio performance: A comment. Financial 
Analysts Journal, 71(5), 6– 7.
74 J. KHALILZADEH ET AL.
Barreda, A. A., & Kizildag, M. (2015). Who are the bulls and 
bears in global lodging markets? Journal of Hospitality 
Financial Management, 23(2), 95– 106.
Bodson, L., Cave, A., & Sougne, D. (2012). Do mutual fund 
investors still trust standard risk- adjusted performance 
measures? Retrieved from http:// orbi .ulg .ac .be/ handle/ 
 2268/ 125346.
Brigham, E., & Ehrhardt, M. (2017). Financial Management. 
Boston: Cengage Learning.
Brooks, C., & Kat, H. M. (2002). The statistical properties 
of hedge fund index returns and their implications for 
investors. Journal of Alternative Investments, 5(2), 26– 44.
Chou, R., Engle, R., & Kane, A. (1992). Measuring risk 
aversion from excess returns on a stock index. Journal of 
Econometrics, 52(1– 2), 201– 224.
Damadoran, A. (n.d.). Estimating Risk Parameters. Retrieved 
from Online Lecture Notes Website: http:// pages .stern .nyu 
.edu/ ~adamodar/ pdfiles/ papers/ beta .pdf.
Eling, M., & Schuhmacher, F. (2007). Does the choice of 
performance measure influence the evaluation of hedge 
funds? Journal of Banking and Finance, 31(9), 2632– 2647.
Elton, E. J., Gruber, M. J., & Blake, C. R. (1996). The 
persistence of risk- adjusted mutual fund performance. 
Journal of Business, 69(2), 133– 157.
Fama, F. E., & French, R. K. (1993). Common risk factors 
in the returns on stocks and bonds. Journal of Financial 
Economics, 33(1), 3– 56.
Fama, F. E., & French, R. K. (2002). Testing trade- off and 
pecking order predictions about dividends and debt. 
Review of Financial Studies, 15(1), 1– 33.
Fornell, C., Mithas, S., Morgeson, F., & Kirshan, M. (2006). 
Customer satisfaction and stock prices: High returns, low 
risk. Journal of Marketing, 70(1), 3– 14.
Fornell, C., Morgeson, F. V., & Hult, G. T. M. (2016). Stock 
returns on customer satisfaction do beat the market: 
Gauging the effect of a marketing intangible. Journal of 
Marketing, 80(5), 92– 107.
Garleanu, N., & Pedersen, H. L. (2011). Margin- based asset 
pricing and deviations from the law of one price. Review of 
Financial Studies, 24(6), 1980– 2022.
Goetzmann, W., & Kumar, A. (2008). Equity portfolio 
diversification. Review of Finance, 12, 433– 463.
Gibson, S., Hotchkiss, E., & Ruback, R. (2000). Valuation 
of bankrupt firms. Review of Financial Economics, 13(1), 
43– 74.
Jensen, M. C. (1968). The performance of mutual funds in the 
period 1945– 1964. Journal of Finance, 23(2), 389– 416.
Katchova, A. L., & Enlow, S. J. (2013). Financial performance 
of publicly- traded agribusinesses. Agricultural Finance 
Review, 73(1), 58– 73.
Kim, M., & Ritter, R. J. (1999). Valuing IPOs. Journal of 
Financial Economics, 53(3), 409– 437.
Kiselakova, D., Horvathova, J., Sofrankova, B., & Soltes, M. 
(2015). Analysis of risks and their impact on enterprise 
performance by creating enterprise risk model. Polish 
Journal of Management Studies, 11(2), 50– 61.
Kizildag, M. (2015). Financial leverage phenomenon in 
hospitality industry sub- sector portfolios. International 
Journal of Contemporary Hospitality Management, 27(8), 
1949– 1978.
Kizildag, M., & Ozdemir, O. (2017). Underlying factors of 
ups and downs in financial leverage overtime. Tourism 
Economics, 23(6), 1321–1342.
Lee, W., Jiang, C., & Indro, D. (2002). Stock market volatility, 
excess returns, and the role of investor sentiment. Journal 
of Banking and Finance, 26(12), 2277– 2299.
Levy, H. (1978). Equilibrium in an imperfect market: A 
constraint on the number of securities in the portfolio. 
American Economic Review, 68(4), 643– 658.
Mao, Z., & Gu, Z. (2007). Risk- adjusted stock performance: 
A cross- sector analysis of hospitality firms in the recent 
economic downturn. International Journal of Hospitality 
and Tourism Administration, 8(4), 77– 98.
Merton, R. C. (1987). A simple model of capital market 
equilibrium with incomplete information. Journal of 
Finance, 42(3), 483– 510.
Ming- Hsiang, C. (2012). A timing strategy for investments in 
U.S. hospitality stocks. Journal of Hospitality and Tourism 
Research, 36(3), 283– 311.
Modigliani, F., & Modigliani, L. (1997). Risk- adjusted 
performance. Journal of Portfolio Management, 23(2), 45– 54.
Muralidhar, A. (2002). Skill, history and risk- adjusted 
performance. Journal of Performance Measurement, 9, 8– 13.
Petersen, G. A., Singh, A. J., & Sheel, A. (2003). Hotel real 
estate in a property investment portfolio: An examination 
of results from 1992 to 2001. Journal of Hospitality 
Financial Management, 11(1), 11– 25.
Petersen, M. A. (2009). Estimating standard errors in finance 
panel data sets: Comparing approaches. Review of Financial 
Studies, 22(1), 435– 480.
Sassan, A., Brandt, W. M., & Diebold, X. F. (2002). Range- 
based estimation of stochastic volatility models. Journal of 
Finance, 57(3), 1047– 1091.
Scholz, H., & Wilkens, M. (2005). Investor- specific performance 
measurement: A justification of Sharpe ratio and Treynor 
Ratio. International Journal of Finance, 17(4), 3671.
Sharma, M., (2004). A.I.R.A.P.– alternative RAPMs for 
alternative investments. Journal of Investment Management, 
2(4), 106– 129.
Sharpe, W. F. (1966). Mutual fund performance. Journal of 
Business, 39(1), 119– 138.
Sorensen, M., & Jagannathan, R. (2015). The public market 
equivalent and private equity performance. Financial 
Analysts Journal, 71(4), 43– 50.
Sullivan, D., Hutchinson, M. C., & O’Connell, V. (2009). 
Empirical evidence of the stock market’s (mis) pricing of 
customer satisfaction. International Journal of Research in 
Marketing, 26(2), 154– 161.
Treynor, J. L. (1965). How to rate management of investment 
funds. Harvard Business Review, 43(1), 63– 75.
Yee, K. T. (2004). Combining value estimates to increase 
accuracy. Financial Analysts Journal, 60(4), 23– 28.
